

Congress of the United States

Washington, DC 20515

October 30, 2025

The Honorable Howard W. Lutnick
Secretary
U.S. Department of Commerce
1401 Constitution Avenue Northwest
Washington, D.C. 20230

Dear Secretary Lutnick:

As you know, the Office of Information and Communications Technology and Services (OICTS) has broad authority to protect the domestic United States' information and communications technology against foreign adversary attempts to undermine American national security. OICTS's authority can and should be used to eliminate products and services created by China and other foreign adversaries from domestic supply chains that are shown to have the potential to introduce security vulnerabilities. In multiple statements of policy, the President has called for more aggressive OICTS actions: the President's America First Trade Policy;¹ Executive Order 14307 entitled, "Unleashing Drone Dominance;"² and the Artificial Intelligence (AI) Action Plan.³

OICTS has demonstrated its effectiveness in addressing national security vulnerabilities. Through a rule issued by the Bureau of Industry and Security of the U.S. Department of Commerce entitled, "Securing the Information and Communications Technology and Services Supply Chain: Connected Vehicles," OICTS has shown the technical capability to create effective and tailored regulations to aggressively mitigate national security risks in the automobile supply chain.⁴

We recommend OICTS investigate and restrict adversary products in other critical and emerging industries to protect the U.S. market from technology threats. In addition to making the U.S. more secure, doing so will help power America's future technological and economic prosperity. The industries in Appendix I require immediate consideration of potential OICTS restrictions to protect against malign Chinese entities that are attempting to infiltrate the U.S. market.

American national security increasingly depends on the entities that control the data,

¹ The White House. "America First Trade Policy." Memorandum, January 20, 2025. <https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/01/america-first-trade-policy/>.

² The White House. "Unleashing American Drone Dominance." Executive Order, June 6, 2025. <https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/06/unleashing-american-drone-dominance/>.

³ The White House. "Winning the Race: America's AI Action Plan." July 2025. <https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/Americas-AI-Action-Plan.pdf>.

⁴ Bureau of Industry and Security, Department of Commerce. "Securing the Information and Communications Technology and Services Supply Chain: Connected Vehicles." Final Rule, 90 FR 5360 (January 16, 2025). <https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/01/16/2025-00592/securing-the-information-and-communications-technology-and-services-supply-chain-connected-vehicles>.

software, and digital systems that power national infrastructure. We have already seen through a variety of cyber-attacks against the United States that China views information technology as a battlefield.⁵ A compromised power grid, an infiltrated telecommunications network, or a manipulated industrial control system can pose as great a threat as a kinetic military strike. The fusion of digital capabilities with critical infrastructure has whittled away geographic borders, as connected infrastructure or products can be controlled or updated by entities in another country. Without a concerted effort to create a secure technology ecosystem from the very beginning of each supply chain, our adversaries will continue to exploit our dependence on their technology to undermine U.S. economic and military stability.

In light of the imminent threat posed to vital American technology sectors by Chinese controlled entities, we request a briefing as soon as possible, but no later than November 30, 2025, on when the Department of Commerce plans to evaluate these sectors and publish OICTS guidance to eliminate the threat.

Sincerely,



John Moolenaar
Chairman
Select Committee on China



Brian Mast
Chairman
House Committee on Foreign Affairs



Eric A. "Rick" Crawford
Chairman
HPSCI



Andrew R. Garbarino
Chairman
Committee on Homeland Security



Bill Huizenga
Chairman
House Committee on Foreign Affairs,
South & Central Asia Subcommittee

⁵ Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency. "People's Republic of China Threat Overview and Advisories." Accessed October 27, 2025. <https://www.cisa.gov/topics/cyber-threats-and-advisories/nation-state-cyber-actors/china>.

APPENDIX I: Industries Needing Immediate Action by OICTS

Sector	Chinese Entity or Chinese Controlled Entity Operating in U.S.	Chinese Parent / Ownership
Advanced & Networked Sensors – cameras, LiDAR, and connected sensors for infrastructure	Hesai Technology ⁶	—
Advanced Medical Equipment & Components – surgical robotics and precision devices	Shanghai MicroPort MedBot (Group) Co., Ltd. ⁷	—
Artificial Intelligence Infrastructure – technologies and equipment for AI datacenters and datacenter construction	DayOne: datacenters construction company ⁸	GDS Holdings Ltd. ⁹
Automated Industrial Machinery & Robotics – robotics to augment U.S. workforce and reshore manufacturing	Unitree Robotics ¹⁰	—
	Kuka Robotics ¹¹	Midea ¹²
Cellular IoT Modules & Device-Management Platforms –	Quectel Wireless Solutions Co., Ltd. ¹³	

⁶ “Hesai.” *Crunchbase*, www.crunchbase.com/organization/hesai. Accessed 30 Sept. 2025.

⁷ “Shanghai MicroPort MedBot (Group) Co., Ltd. – Interim Results Announcement for the Six Months Ended 30 June 2025.” *Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing Limited*, 28 Aug. 2025, www.hkexnews.hk/listedco/listconews/sehk/2025/0828/2025082803066.pdf. Accessed 30 Sept. 2025.

⁸ Swinhoe, Dan. “GDS Rebrands International Unit as DayOne.” *Data Center Dynamics*, 6 Jan. 2025, www.datacenterdynamics.com/en/news/gds-rebrands-international-unit-as-dayone/

⁹ “GDS.” *GDS Services Ltd.*, www.gds-services.com/en/. Accessed 30 Sept. 2025.

¹⁰ “Unitree Robotics.” *Crunchbase*, www.crunchbase.com/organization/unitree-robotics. Accessed 30 Sept. 2025.

¹¹ “Midea — Robotics and Automation.” *Midea Group*, www.midea.com.cn/en/our-businesses/Robotics-and-Automation. Accessed 30 Sept. 2025.

¹² “Midea — About Midea.” *Midea Group*, www.midea.com.cn/en/about-midea. Accessed 30 Sept. 2025.

¹³ “Quectel Wireless Solutions Co., Ltd. Company Shareholders.” *MarketScreener*, <https://au.marketscreener.com/quote/stock/QUECTEL-WIRELESS-SOLUTION-65220644/company-shareholders/>. Accessed 6 Oct. 2025.

Sector	Chinese Entity or Chinese Controlled Entity Operating in U.S.	Chinese Parent / Ownership
LTE/5G/NB-IoT modules, eSIM/iSIM provisioning, device clouds, and firmware-over-the-air (FOTA) services embedded in critical equipment.	Fibocom Wireless USA, Inc. ¹⁴	Fibocom Wireless Inc. ¹⁵
Electronic Design Automation (EDA) Tools & Semiconductor IP Cores – chip design software, verification toolchains, standard-cell libraries, and reusable processor/multimedia IP blocks that precede fabrication.	VeriSilicon, Inc. ¹⁶	Verisilicon Microelectronics (Shanghai) Company Ltd. ¹⁷
	DaVinci, Ltd. ¹⁸	Empyrean Technology Co., Ltd. ¹⁹
Energy Generation & Storage – technologies for grids, transmission, storage (esp. for AI growth)	Sungrow USA ²⁰	Sungrow Power Supply Co., Ltd. ²¹
	Hithium Energy Storage ²²	—
Industrial Control Systems (ICS/SCADA) & PLCs – supervisory control software and programmable logic controllers	Hollysys Automation Technologies Ltd. ²³	Superior Technologies Holding Ltd. ²⁴

¹⁴ “Fibocom Will Acquire Sierra Wireless Automotive Embedded Module Product Line Through Its Joint Venture Company.” *GSMA*, <https://www.gsma.com/get-involved/gsm-membership/gsm-resources/fibocom-will-acquire-sierra-wireless-automotive-embedded-module-product-line-through-its-joint-venture-company/#:~:text=Fibocom%20is%20headquartered%20in%20Shenzhen,than%20100%20countries%20and%20regions>. Accessed 6 Oct. 2025.

¹⁵ “Global Offices – Global Leading Wireless Modules & IoT Solutions.” *Fibocom*, <https://www.fibocom.com/en/gh/index.html>. Accessed 6 Oct. 2025.

¹⁶ WireScreen dataset. Accessed: 10/07/2025.

¹⁷ WireScreen dataset. Accessed: 10/07/2025.

¹⁸ WireScreen dataset. Accessed: 10/07/2025.

¹⁹ WireScreen dataset. Accessed: 10/07/2025.

²⁰ “Sungrow.” *Sungrow Power Supply Co., Ltd.*, <https://en.sungrowpower.com/>. Accessed 30 Sept. 2025.

²¹ “Forbes. “Sungrow Power Supply.” *Forbes*, www.forbes.com/companies/sungrow-power-supply/#:~:text=The%20company%20was%20founded%20by%20Cao%20Renxian,1997%20and%20is%20headquartered%20in%20Hefei%2C%20China. Accessed 30 Sept. 2025. ”

²² “HiThium.” *Crunchbase*, www.crunchbase.com/organization/hithium. Accessed 30 Sept. 2025.

²³ “Hollysys Completes Merger with Ascendent Capital.” *Investing.com*, 25 July 2024, <https://www.investing.com/news/company-news/hollysys-completes-merger-with-ascendent-capital-93CH-3537448>. Accessed 6 Oct. 2025.

²⁴ “Hollysys Announces Completion of Merger Transaction with Ascendent Capital Partners.” *PR Newswire*, 25 July 2024, <https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/hollysys-announces-completion-of-merger-transaction-with-ascendent-capital-partners-302206694.html>. Accessed 6 Oct. 2025.

Sector	Chinese Entity or Chinese Controlled Entity Operating in U.S.	Chinese Parent / Ownership
that operate factories, pipelines, water systems, rail, and buildings across non-energy infrastructure.		
Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), Certificate Authorities & Code-Signing Services – cryptographic trust services that underpin operating systems, applications, and secure firmware/software update pipelines.	TrustAsia (Certification Authority) ²⁵	—
Routers & Communications Hardware – networking hardware/software for ICT	Futurewei Technologies Inc. ²⁶	Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd ²⁷
	TP-Link Systems Inc. ²⁸	Mr. Jianjun Zhao ²⁹³⁰
Semiconductor Manufacturing Equipment – fabrication tools critical to semiconductor production	ACM Research, Inc. ³¹	Shengmei Semiconductor Equipment (Shanghai) Co., Ltd., aka ACM Research (Shanghai), Inc. ³²
Subsea Cable Systems & Landing-Station Equipment – repeaters, branching units, power-feed equipment, and	HMN Tech (formerly Huawei Marine Networks) ³³	

²⁵ “TrustAsia – Global SSL Certificates and Cybersecurity Solutions.” *TrustAsia*, <https://www.trustasia.com/index-en>. Accessed 6 Oct. 2025.

²⁶ “Letter to Futurewei Technologies, Inc. Requesting Information” *Select Committee on the CCP*, 24 Sept. 2025, selectcommitteeontheccp.house.gov/sites/evo-subsites/selectcommitteeontheccp.house.gov/files/evo-media-document/2025-09-24-letter-to-futurewei.pdf. Accessed 30 Sept. 2025.

²⁷ “Huawei.” *Crunchbase*, www.crunchbase.com/organization/huawei. Accessed 30 Sept. 2025.

²⁸ *California Secretary of State. Statement of Information: TP-Link Systems Inc.* Filed 20 Feb. 2025, File No. BA20250358042. Office of the Secretary of State, Sacramento, CA.

²⁹ “TP-LINK UK Limited — Persons with Significant Control.” *Find and Update Company Information*, UK Government, find-and-update.company-information.service.gov.uk/company/07205003/persons-with-significant-control. Accessed 30 Sept. 2025.

³⁰ Berman, Noah. “How Chinese Is TP-Link?” *The Wire China*, 9 Jan. 2025, www.thewirechina.com/2025/01/09/how-chinese-is-tp-link/. Accessed 30 Sept. 2025.

³¹ “ACM Research.” *Crunchbase*, www.crunchbase.com/organization/acm-research. Accessed 30 Sept. 2025.

³² “Shengmei Semiconductor Equipment.” *Crunchbase*, www.crunchbase.com/organization/shengmei-semiconductor-equipment. Accessed 30 Sept. 2025.

³³ “US Pushes for Ban on Chinese Technology in Subsea Cables.” *Data Center Dynamics*, 18 July 2025, Paul Lipscombe, <https://www.datacenterdynamics.com/en/news/us-pushes-for-ban-on-chinese-technology-in-subsea-cables/>. Accessed 7 Oct. 2025.

Sector	Chinese Entity or Chinese Controlled Entity Operating in U.S.	Chinese Parent / Ownership
shore-end control systems enabling intercontinental data transport.		
Trucking – ground transport & logistics	BYD Company Limited ³⁴	—
Unmanned Systems – drones (air, sea, land) for commercial & government	DJI ³⁵	—

³⁴ “BYD Company Limited: Shareholders, Board Members, Managers and Company Profile.” *MarketScreener*, www.marketscreener.com/quote/stock/BYD-COMPANY-LIMITED-12615771/company/. Accessed 30 Sept. 2025.

³⁵ “DJI.” *PitchBook*, pitchbook.com/profiles/company/66264-67. Accessed 30 Sept. 2025.