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April 16, 2025

Mr. Jensen Huang  
Chief Executive Officer  
NVIDIA Corporation  
2788 San Tomas Expressway  
Santa Clara, CA 95051

Dear Mr. Huang,

We write today to express our concerns about the potential use by Hangzhou DeepSeek Artificial Intelligence Basic Technology Research Co., Ltd. (DeepSeek) of NVIDIA chips that are subject to U.S. export controls. Since the release of DeepSeek's R1 chatbot in January 2025, the U.S. Department of Commerce has reportedly launched an investigation into the illicit use of both hardware and software by DeepSeek, including the potential use of restricted NVIDIA chips diverted through third countries to the People's Republic of China (PRC).<sup>1</sup> Indeed, the recent arrest of three men in Singapore—including one PRC national—for allegedly fraudulently labeling the end-use customer of NVIDIA chips provides evidence of this exact concern.<sup>2</sup>

Despite multiple rounds of U.S. export restrictions on AI chips, DeepSeek's ability to develop cutting-edge AI models suggests that loopholes or indirect channels may still exist. This raises serious questions about whether current U.S. export control laws adequately prevent the most sensitive AI technologies from falling into the hands of our adversaries. Failure to correct deficiencies could undermine U.S. AI and technological leadership, affecting economic and national security for Americans.

While the PRC seeks to import U.S. chips for key industries, including AI development, it is also continuing its state-backed efforts to close the technological gap with the very U.S. manufacturers that make those chips, such as NVIDIA. General Secretary Xi Jinping emphasized

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<sup>1</sup> Jordan Robertson, et al., *US Probing If DeepSeek Got Nvidia Chips from Firms in Singapore*, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 25, 2025) available at [www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-01-31/us-probing-whether-deepseek-got-nvidia-chips-through-singapore?sref=HrWXCALa](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-01-31/us-probing-whether-deepseek-got-nvidia-chips-through-singapore?sref=HrWXCALa).

<sup>2</sup> *3 Men Charged with Fraud, Cases Linked to Alleged Movement of Nvidia Chips*, CHANNEL NEWS ASIA (Feb. 28, 2025), available at [www.channelnewsasia.com/singapore/3-men-charged-fraud-nvidia-chips-singapore-china-deepseek-4964721](https://www.channelnewsasia.com/singapore/3-men-charged-fraud-nvidia-chips-singapore-china-deepseek-4964721).

this goal of technological dominance at the 20th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party.<sup>3</sup> During his speech, Xi instructed the country to “win the battle” in core technologies.<sup>4</sup> The U.S. government and private sector must ensure that the United States maintains its dominance in AI and computing components for years to come.

For these and related reasons, we request the following documents and information as soon as possible but no later than April 30, 2025:

1. A list of NVIDIA’s customers that (a) have purchased more than 499 AI-related chips and accelerators (H100, A100, H800, A800, H20, L40S, B100, B200, B20, etc.) between January 1, 2020, and today;<sup>5</sup> and (b) are located in or list an end-use destination in any of the following countries:
  - Association of Southeast Asian States (ASEAN) member states (Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam)
  - China (including Hong Kong and Macau)For each qualifying customer, please include:
  - Customer name
  - Date(s) of purchase
  - Type and number of chip(s) or accelerators purchased
  - Country and entity for end-use destination
2. Any communications and correspondence between NVIDIA and DeepSeek (including its affiliates, funding entities, and leadership or other personnel); and
3. All contractual documents and agreements, including but not limited to customer agreements, memorandums of understanding, or research agreements that NVIDIA has with any PRC entity prohibited or restricted by the U.S. government (including, but not limited to Section 1260H of the 2021 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) Entity List, the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act (UFLPA) Entity List, the Commerce Department's Military End User List, Executive Order 14059, the Specially Designated Nationals and

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<sup>3</sup> Harry Booth, *How China Is Advancing in AI Despite U.S. Chip Restrictions*, TIME (Jan. 28, 2025) available at [www.time.com/7204164/china-ai-advances-chips/](https://www.time.com/7204164/china-ai-advances-chips/); Josh Horwitz, *Xi's call to win tech race points to new wave of Chinese state-led spending*, REUTERS (Oct. 17, 2022) available at [www.reuters.com/world/china/xis-call-win-tech-race-points-new-wave-chinese-state-led-spending-2022-10-17/](https://www.reuters.com/world/china/xis-call-win-tech-race-points-new-wave-chinese-state-led-spending-2022-10-17/).

<sup>4</sup> *Id.*

<sup>5</sup> For purposes of determining if any customer meets the 499-unit threshold in (a), please include in such threshold calculations the purchases and orders of any entities known to be, or reasonably appearing to be, affiliates or otherwise related entities. The 499-unit threshold refers to aggregate purchases over the relevant time period.

Mr. Jensen Huang

April 16, 2025


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Blocked Persons (SDN) List, and the Non-SDN Chinese Military-Industrial Complex (NS-CMIC) Companies List).<sup>6</sup>


The House Select Committee on the Strategic Competition Between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party has broad authority to investigate and submit policy recommendations on countering the economic, technological, security, and ideological threats of the Chinese Communist Party to the United States and allies and partners of the United States under H. Res. 5 Sec. 4(a).

Thank you for your attention to this important matter. In order to deliver a response or ask any follow up related questions, please contact Select Committee staff.

Sincerely,



John Moolenaar  
Chairman



Raja Krishnamoorthi  
Ranking Member

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<sup>6</sup> For purposes of this request, please produce such materials even if the prohibited or restricted entity did not appear on the corresponding U.S. Government list at the time of the execution of the contract or agreement.