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July 8, 2025

Chancellor Kim A. Wilcox
University of California, Riverside
Office of the Chancellor
4108 Hinderaker Hall
Riverside, CA 92521

Dear Chancellor Wilcox,

The Committee is undertaking a systematic review of the PRC's China Scholarship Council's infiltration of U.S. colleges and universities. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is developing and acquiring key technologies through both legal and illegal means, including investments in private industries, talent recruitment programs, directing academic and research relationships and collaboration for its military gain, forced technology transfer, intelligence gathering, and outright theft. One of the nefarious mechanisms that the CCP relies on is the China Scholarship Council (CSC). CSC purports to be a joint scholarship program between U.S. and Chinese institutions; however, in reality it is a CCP-managed technology transfer effort that exploits U.S. institutions and directly supports China's military and scientific growth.

As a result, we write to express our concerns regarding the University of California, Riverside (UC Riverside) ongoing joint scholarship program with the CSC, which sponsors up to 50 students from the People's Republic of China (PRC) annually to conduct research at UCR for up to 48 months.¹ We urge you to assess whether allowing CSC-sponsored PRC graduate students to study and conduct research in cutting-edge technology at UCR aligns with American interests and U.S. national security policies, particularly in light of Presidential Proclamation 10043, issued by President Trump in May 2020 and upheld by the Biden Administration.²

Under the Presidential Proclamation, current and past affiliates of certain PRC academic and research institutions central to the PRC's military-civil fusion strategy would face F and J visa denials or revocations. Notably, a June 2021 survey of visa-denied students found that the majority had either completed their studies at China's "Seven Sons of National Defense" (国防

¹ Announcement/Release, China Scholarship Council, 2025 China Scholarship Council Cooperative Scholarship with University of California, Riverside, USA (August 20, 2024), <https://www.csc.edu.cn/article/3312>

² Public Release, National Archives, Suspension of Entry as Nonimmigrants of Certain Students and Researchers from the People's Republic of China (June 4, 2020), <https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2020/06/04/2020-12217/suspension-of-entry-as-nonimmigrants-of-certain-students-and-researchers-from-the-peoples-republic>

七子) universities and Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications or were funded by CSC.³ Following the release of the Presidential Proclamation, University of North Texas ended its partnership with CSC after being briefed by federal and local law enforcement.⁴

According to the CSC's website, applicants eligible for the UCR-CSC Joint Scholarship can apply to any graduate degree program at UCR. Under the Joint Scholarship program, CSC provides tuition coverage and living stipend for up to 24 months for master's students and up to 48 months for doctoral students.⁵ CSC further states that UCR offers full tuition coverage and health insurance for CSC-sponsored doctoral students starting from their third year of study, provided they maintain good academic standing.⁶ Additionally, UCR provides living stipends through fellowships, teaching assistantships, or research assistantships to ensure funding levels are consistent with those of other doctoral students in the same program. UCR also strives to offer CSC-sponsored master's students' opportunities such as teaching assistant positions and ensures that joint doctoral students have access to the necessary resources, equipment, and facilities to conduct their research.⁷

Unlike other international student programs, the CSC has faced increasing scrutiny and criticism due to concerns over academic freedom, surveillance of students, ideological control, and potential espionage.^{8,9} For example, CSC mandates that sponsored students return to the PRC upon completing their studies and serve the PRC for at least two years.¹⁰ Additionally, CSC requires these sponsored students to submit a report to PRC embassies or consulates every three months, detailing their academic progress, laboratory work, research outputs, and publications. PRC diplomatic missions are tasked to monitor the "ideological and academic progress" of CSC-

³ News Article, Shaman, Radio France International, Chinese students have been deported to the United States, and Beijing angrily pointed out the U.S. Executive Order 10043 (April 1, 2024), <https://www.rfi.fr/cn/专栏检索/要闻分析/20240104-中国留学生赴美有遭遣返-北京愤指美国 10043 号行政令>

⁴ News Article, Ileana Garnand, North Texas Daily, Visiting Chinese scholars left with unanswered questions after university terminates relationship with Chinese Scholarship Council (September 10, 2024), https://www.ntdaily.com/news/visiting-chinese-scholars-left-with-unanswered-questions-after-university-terminates-relationship-with-chinese-scholarship-council/article_308b04cc-6b0b-5462-944d-983d16e5f0f6.html

⁵ Announcement/Release, China Scholarship Council, 2025 China Scholarship Council Cooperative Scholarship with University of California, Riverside, USA (August 20, 2024), <https://www.csc.edu.cn/article/3312>

⁶ Id.

⁷ Id.

⁸ Article, Human Rights Foundation, Beyond Borders: China's Attempts to Censor Global Academia (April 22, 2024), <https://archive.hrf.org/beyond-borders-chinas-attempts-to-censor-global-academia/>

⁹ U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission Report, U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission Report, Section 2: Battling for Overseas Hearts and Minds: China's United Front and Propaganda Work (November 11, 2024), https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/2023-11/Chapter_2_Section_2--Chinas_United_Front_and_Propaganda_Work.pdf

¹⁰ Published Report, Center for Security and Emerging Technology, China Scholarship Council Subsidized Study Abroad Agreement 资助出国留学协议书 (May 8, 2020), <https://cset.georgetown.edu/publication/china-scholarship-council-subsidized-study-abroad-agreement/>

sponsored students.^{11,12} Even non-Party students' ideological guidance is reinforced. Previously, PRC diplomatic missions abroad often organized political education sessions for all CSC-funded students under programs such as the "Safe Study Abroad" (平安留学), where officials discuss patriotism, Chinese laws (e.g., China's National Security Law), and the importance of representing the country well.^{13,14} This raises further concerns about the program's alignment with U.S. national security interests.

As a major research university, UCR relies on significant federal funding to support its research activities. In Fiscal Year 2023, UCR received \$214.8 million in total research funding, of which over \$120.5 million came from federal sources.¹⁵ Meanwhile, the PRC has a well-documented history of exploiting the openness of the American higher education and research system to enhance its technological competitiveness and military capabilities. Given these concerns, it is alarming that UCR maintains a joint scholarship program with CSC — explicitly designed to develop PRC talent especially in cutting-edge technology at graduate levels. Even more troubling is the fact that UCR actively subsidizes such a program. It is imperative that UCR reassess whether this joint scholarship program serves U.S. interests.

In light of these concerns, we request that your institution reconsider its participation in the UCR-CSC joint scholarship program and produce documents and information sufficient to respond to the following questions by July 22, 2025:

1. Please produce all documents, including but not limited to any meeting minutes, contracts, correspondence and memoranda of understanding, regarding the contractual relationships between your institution and CSC.
2. Please produce a list—with a numerical breakdown of how many—of which Chinese entities CSC-sponsored students came from between May 2020 and May 2025.
3. Please produce a list—with a numerical breakdown of how many—of which Chinese entities CSC-sponsored students went to post graduation from May 2024 to the present.

¹¹ Public Release, Jiaowai Liu, Ministry of Education, Circular of the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Finance on Printing and Distributing the Administrative Regulations on Postgraduate Students Studying Abroad on Public Assignment (for Trial Implementation) (July 16, 2007), http://www.moe.gov.cn/s78/A20/s7068/201410/t20141021_178464.html

¹² Study Report, Ministry of Education, Study and Research Report by Chinese Students and Scholars, <http://www.moe.gov.cn/publicfiles/business/htmlfiles/moe/cmsmedia/document/2731.doc>

¹³ Public Release, China Scholarship Council. 国家留学基金资助出国留学人员须知 [Notice for National Scholarship Fund Recipients Studying Abroad] (2012). <https://www.csc.edu.cn/uploads/《国家留学基金资助出国留学人员须知》2012年版.pdf>

¹⁴ Public release, Beijing Foreign Studies University, Study Abroad Safely 平安留学, <https://international.bfsu.edu.cn/hwxx/palx.htm>

¹⁵ Published Report, National Center for Science and Engineering Statistics, Higher Education Research and Development (HERD) Survey (November, 2024), <https://nces.nsf.gov/surveys/higher-education-research-development/2023#data>

4. Please produce a list of how many CSC-sponsored students came to your institution from May 2020 and May 2025 under a non-STEM (science, technology, engineering, and mathematics) program and subsequently switched majors to a STEM program.
5. Since May 2020, have any CSC-funded students worked on research funded by any U.S. government entity or funds used from any government entity used to support CSC sponsored students and scholars? If yes, please provide which federally funded grants.
6. Has your institution communicated with the Department of State and Department of Homeland Security for clarity on whether CSC-sponsored graduate students are subject to Presidential Proclamation 10043 visa restrictions?
7. Has your institution provided information about the funding sources of CSC-sponsored students to the Departments of State and Homeland Security for visa vetting since the issuance of Presidential Proclamation 10043?
8. How many CSC-sponsored graduate students, Ph.D., and post-docs in STEM fields have come to study or conduct research at your institution since Presidential Executive Order 10043 was issued in May 2020?
9. How many CSC-sponsored students are currently studying or doing research in STEM fields at your institution?
10. Have any CSC-sponsored students in STEM fields stayed at your institution for post-doctoral research after completing their Ph.D.? If yes, has federal funding been used to support their post-doctoral research at your institution?
11. Since May 2020, have any professors at your institution specifically sponsored students funded by the CSC?
12. Does the CSC or any Chinese entity provide any additional funding directly or indirectly to your institution through restricted or unrestricted foreign gifts, contracts, and/or endowments for CSC students or related to the CSC agreement?
13. Please justify how supporting PRC talent development in STEM fields through your institution's joint CSC scholarship program, which requires beneficiaries to return to serve the PRC, advances U.S. interests.

The House Select Committee on the Strategic Competition Between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party has broad authority to “investigate and submit policy recommendations on the status of the Chinese Communist Party’s economic, technological, and security progress and its competition with the United States” under H. Res. 11. Upon receipt of this letter, please maintain and preserve all hard copy and electronic documents, including electronic communications, related to the subject matter of this letter.

We appreciate your prompt attention to these concerns and look forward to your response.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in blue ink that reads "John Moolenaar". The signature is fluid and cursive, with the first name "John" and last name "Moolenaar" clearly distinguishable.

John Moolenaar
Chairman
House Select Committee on the CCP