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WASHINGTON, D.C. — Chairman John Moolenaar (R-MI), and Ranking Member Raja Krishnamoorthi (D-IL) of the House Select Committee on Strategic Competition Between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party, sent a letter to Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Director Christopher Wray and Director of National Intelligence (DNI) Avril Haines requesting a briefing on a People’s Republic of China (PRC) biotech firm GenScript Biotechnology and its three main business segments — Bestzyme, Legend Biotech, and ProBio — for their ties to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the implications these connections may have for U.S. national security.
The lawmakers write, “GenScript’s role as a Contract Development and Manufacturing Organization (CDMO), including services such as the production of custom gene synthesis for companies and U.S. Government entities, raises concerns about potential risks to the intellectual property of U.S. firms and GenScript's broader role in advancing the PRC’s biotech capabilities."
They continue, "GenScript is working to establish CCP-controlled chokepoints in critical areas of biotechnology in which the U.S. currently leads... GenScript’s public statements and the active role of its internal CCP Committee in guiding company strategy suggest a concerted effort to advance Beijing’s goal of reducing reliance on foreign biotech and achieving a dominant position in the global industry."
The lawmakers requested that the DNI and FBI Director brief the Select Committee on available intelligence and law enforcement information regarding GenScript Biotech Corporation and its U.S.-based subsidiaries to determine the extent of CCP influence and control over their operations, the potential risks they pose to U.S. national security, and the implications of their efforts to displace U.S. leadership in the biotechnology sector.
View the lawmakers’ letter to FBI Director Wray and DNI Haines HERE or continue reading below:
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Dear Director Haines and Director Wray,
We write to request a briefing on a People’s Republic of China (PRC) biotech firm GenScript Biotechnology Co., Ltd. and its three main business segments — Bestzyme, Legend Biotech, and ProBio — for their ties to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the implications these connections may have for U.S. national security. GenScript’s role as a Contract Development and Manufacturing Organization (CDMO), including services such as the production of custom gene synthesis for companies and U.S. Government entities, raises concerns about potential risks to the intellectual property of U.S. firms and GenScript's broader role in advancing the PRC’s biotech capabilities.
Public reporting reveals tight links between GenScript and the CCP. Enclosed is a diagram mapping out GenScript’s corporate structure, highlighting links to state-owned enterprises and embedded Party committees. GenScript’s primary operations are based in Nanjing, PRC, and the company’s Party Committee plays an active role in its operations. For example, Shao Weihui, the Secretary of GenScript Group’s Party Committee, has acted as Chief Executive Officer and is a member of the company’s Sanctions Risk Control Committee.
Additional key leadership positions within GenScript include the Deputy Secretaries of its Party Committee, Liu Chao and Jiang Feng, who serve as the Director of the company’s Government Affairs Department and Operations Manager of the company’s New Product R&D Project Department, respectively. Moreover, Xianhu Fan, the founder and former Chief Scientific Officer of Nanjing Legend Biotech, served as a member of Nanjing Legend Biotech’s Party Committee until October 2022.
Since 2023, GenScript has received U.S. government contracts that in total are worth millions of dollars from the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), the Department of Agriculture (USDA), the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA). These contracts span a range of products and services, including customized protein production, laboratory equipment, and drugs and biologicals.
Of particular concern is evidence suggesting GenScript is working to establish CCP-controlled chokepoints in critical areas of biotechnology in which the U.S. currently leads. Zhang Fangliang, GenScript’s co-founder and one of its ultimate beneficial owners, expressed concern about the underrepresentation of PRC biotech products in the U.S. market and identified the growing opportunity for biotech development in the PRC as a key motivation for launching the company. By filling key gaps in the PRC’s biotech capabilities, Zhang’s efforts through GenScript appear to directly support the CCP’s strategic goal of achieving self-reliance in critical technologies and leveraging these advancements to boost the PRC’s global competitiveness and influence. In a telling statement after leaving his position at Schering-Plough in the United States to establish GenScript’s PRC-base in 2004, Zhang remarked, “although science has no borders, scholars have their own motherland.” This statement underscores GenScript’s commitment to advancing the PRC’s biotech industry and directly challenging U.S. leadership in this vital sector.
GenScript’s public statements and the active role of its internal CCP Committee in guiding company strategy suggest a concerted effort to advance Beijing’s goal of reducing reliance on foreign biotech and achieving a dominant position in the global industry. While these aspirations do not necessarily equate to illicit behavior, they do underscore the need for vigilance in safeguarding U.S. competitiveness and preventing the transfer of sensitive technologies and capabilities to PRC state-influenced entities.
Given these findings, we respectfully request that you brief the Select Committee on available intelligence and law enforcement information regarding GenScript Biotech Corporation and its U.S.-based subsidiaries to determine the extent of CCP influence and control over their operations, the potential risks they pose to U.S. national security, and the implications of their efforts to displace U.S. leadership in the biotechnology sector. We believe it is crucial to ensure that companies operating within the United States, particularly those in sensitive industries such as biotechnology, are not compromised by foreign government interests that may undermine our nation’s security and competitiveness.
We kindly request that you respond to arrange a briefing for the Select Committee by June 28, 2024.
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