Fox in the Henhouse
The U.S. Department of Defense Research and Engineering's Failures to Protect Taxpayer-Funded Defense Research
Over the past two years, the Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party and the Committee on Education and the Workforce’s (Committees) investigations revealed how the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) exploits U.S. universities—and gains access to U.S. government-funded research—to fuel its military and technological rise.
The U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) funds research for the purpose of achieving technological breakthroughs to equip future warfighters. The Select Committee undertook an extensive review of DOD-funded research projects that also involved People’s Republic of China (PRC) military connections. The examples reviewed reveal a pervasive and deeply troubling pattern of U.S. taxpayer-funded research being conducted in collaboration with Chinese entities that are directly tied to China’s defense research and industrial base—many of which appear on various U.S. government entity lists—and state-sponsored talent recruitment programs. These collaborations involved research in sensitive technical domains such as hypersonics, quantum sensing, semiconductors, artificial intelligence (AI), advanced materials, cyber warfare, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) systems, and next-generation propulsion—many with clear military applications.
Balancing academic freedom and open science with national security interests is important. However, unlike in democratic societies—where the norms of scientific openness are grounded in reciprocal trust, transparency, and research integrity—PRC institutions operate under a state-directed research model that is deeply politicized and subordinate to national strategic objectives, including military and economic priorities.
This investigative report presents findings of research relationships with the PRC and long-standing shortcomings in DOD policies and practices to safeguard taxpayer-funded research from exploitation by China’s defense research and industrial base.
This report finds the following:
Recent DOD-funded Publications Reveal Continued Research Relationships with China’s Defense Research and Industrial Base. The Select Committee identified approximately 1,400 research papers published between June 2023 and June 2025, acknowledging DOD funding or research support that also involved collaboration with PRC entities, which included over 300 DOD grants. Of these, over 700 publications—or just over 50%—were conducted in partnership with entities affiliated with China’s defense research and industrial base.
Continued Collaboration with China’s Defense Research and Industrial Base. Numerous DOD-funded research awards—some still active—have been conducted in collaboration with entities directly tied to China’s defense research and industrial base. Among the most concerning are partnerships involving the “Seven Sons of National Defense” Chinese universities, numerous State Administration for Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defense (SASTIND) co-administered schools, national defense-designated laboratories, the Chinese Academy of Engineering Physics (CAEP), a Chinese cyber-range, and BGI (formerly Beijing Genomics Institute)—all of which have been publicly linked to the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and some of which appear on U.S. government entity lists due to their roles in advancing China’s military capabilities or engaging in human rights violations. Even when entities appear on the U.S. Department of Commerce Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) Entity List, the DOD 1260H List, or other federal restricted lists—and are widely recognized as supporting the PLA—DOD-funded researchers are still, in many cases, permitted to collaborate with them. This lapse reflects DOD R&E’s failure to adopt a proactive approach to prohibiting such collaborations.
Recent DOD-Funded Publications Reveal Research Relationships with Entities Known to Commit Human Rights Abuses and Support China’s Mass Surveillance Apparatus. Much of the current discourse around research security focuses on the national security risks of conducting federally funded research with Chinese entities—a critically important concern. However, an equally urgent issue is the ethical aspect of research: what the research is enabling, and who we are choosing to collaborate with. The Select Committee identified multiple instances where DOD-funded research involved entities with well-documented roles in human rights abuses or direct participation in China’s mass surveillance apparatus.
Why Protecting DOD-Funded Research Matters: Case Studies on How U.S. Hypersonics and Fundamental Research Advanced PLA Strategic Weapons Development. To underscore the risks of PRC collaboration involving DOD-funded research, the Select Committee identified two troubling case studies. The first involves U.S. participation in hypersonic research and development with a “Seven Sons of National Defense” Chinese university—which directly supports PLA hypersonic weapons research and development. The second concerns fundamental research on nitrogen conducted in partnership with a Chinese Academy of Sciences lab, which allegedly led to breakthroughs in high-yield explosives and contributed to advancements in China’s nuclear weapons development. Most strikingly, the Committee obtained documents attributed to the Chinese Academy of Engineering—a PRC governmental body—detailing a 12-year research partnership between a U.S. professor, who had worked on DOD-funded research for more than a decade, and a Chinese institution. The Chinese government credited this collaboration with “leading China to develop new materials and technologies for cutting-edge defense weapons and equipment, such as nanomaterial synthesis, multiscale fine structure control, as well as additive manufacturing technology and continuously narrow the technology gap with more advanced countries.” The same document specifically referenced the U.S. Navy—one of the DOD entities that funded research the U.S. professor worked on—noting: “The U.S. Navy and the Boeing Company have made full use of this technology to achieve lightweight structural materials. This key technology has profound practical significance for China’s aerospace technology development and modern defense construction. It will effectively help to facilitate industrial breakthroughs in high-end equipment and new materials.”
Shortfalls in DOD Research & Engineering (R&E) Policies. Despite its critical role in funding and advancing U.S. innovation in emerging and dual-use technologies for the warfighter, DOD R&E has not established consistency for research security, due diligence, compliance and monitoring, or uniform access to necessary data and tools across the Department. This has resulted in fragmented and uneven practices among its components and funding entities.
Despite the enactment of Section 1286 (1286 List) of the Fiscal Year (FY) 2019 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) and further prohibitions in the FY2025 NDAA, DOD R&E has not meaningfully updated its risk framework or enforcement protocols. For example, DOD has added only a small fraction of China’s known talent recruitment programs and defense-designated laboratories to the 1286 List, even though both government and private sector analyses have identified many more.
DOD R&E does not currently prohibit research relationships on fundamental research with entities DOD has designated as national security threats under the DOD 1260H List—rendering the list functionally meaningless and undermining its own research security framework. Additionally, DOD does not currently prohibit research relationships with entities on other U.S. government restricted lists (such as the BIS Entity List or the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) Sanctions List), nor with other publicly documented organizations, including SASTIND co-administered universities, state-owned defense conglomerates, national defense–designated laboratories, and components of China’s intelligence and security apparatus.
DOD R&E’s Risk Matrix, as currently implemented, suffers from fundamental structural and operational deficiencies that render it ineffective at identifying, mitigating or prohibiting high-risk activities and/or collaborations with foreign entities.
DOD components responsible for research security lack uniform access to both tools and relevant internal grant data, undermining their ability to conduct holistic and rigorous reviews of individuals under consideration.
To date, DOD R&E has not established a standardized training program for conducting research security due diligence assessments across all DOD components.
DOD components currently do not share their research security risk assessments with one another, even when evaluating the same individuals or institutions.
Not all DOD research security offices have access to their own component’s grant records.
DOD does not currently conduct post-award compliance or monitoring of grants—even in cases where risk mitigation measures were required.
The DOD has not taken a clear policy position—within its risk matrix or broader research security framework—on engagements with foreign entities that pose ethical and human rights risks.
DOD does not currently incorporate Section 117 foreign gift and contract disclosure data into its framework for grant proposals and submissions.
DOD R&E has not established a centralized or standardized proposal submission portal for fundamental research awards across the Department.
DOD R&E’s current policy does not scrutinize foreign students working on DOD-funded research unless they are designated as a “covered individual” or key personnel.
Under the current DOD R&E Risk Matrix, if an individual files a patent in a foreign country of concern—such as China—either prior to filing in the United States or on behalf of that foreign country, even when the invention is based on U.S. government-funded research, such behavior is treated merely as a discouraged factor, not a prohibited one.
Unprotected Research: Fueling the PRC’s Rise. While global collaboration in scientific and engineering research is essential to advancing innovation and solving shared challenges, the PRC has systematically weaponized this openness. Despite these risks, some within DOD maintain that if research is deemed “fundamental”—and is neither controlled nor classified—it should remain open. This position disregards the reality that such openness enables exploitation and targeting by China, particularly in defense-relevant fields with clear military applications. This can undermine U.S. national interests and security and enable the exploitation of DOD-funded research in critical technology areas. Through a state-directed apparatus that includes talent recruitment programs, military-civil fusion policies, and extensive use of foreign partnerships, China has exploited international research cooperation to acquire sensitive technologies and technical know-how to directly compete in technology areas and warfighting capabilities with the United States.
These efforts advance the PRC’s strategic goals of economic dominance, technological superiority, and military modernization—often at the expense of U.S. national security and technological leadership. What was intended as open scientific exchange has, in many cases, become a conduit for the transfer of taxpayer-funded innovation into the hands of a dangerous strategic adversary.
Failing to safeguard American research from hostile foreign exploitation will continue to erode U.S. technological dominance and place our national defense capabilities at risk. The time for passive risk tolerance is over. American taxpayer dollars should be used to defend the nation—not strengthen its foremost strategic competitor.
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Select Committee on the CCP Chairman John Moolenaar is therefore introducing the Securing American Funding and Expertise from Adversarial Research Exploitation Act of 2025 (SAFE Research Act), which:
Prohibits federal science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) research funding to researchers who collaborate with foreign adversary-controlled entities that pose a national security risk.
Prohibits DOD funding to universities that partner with foreign adversary-controlled entities that pose a national security risk.
Requires enhanced disclosures of foreign adversary collaborations, travel, and affiliations from foreign adversary entities.
The SAFE Research Act is attached to this report. We look forward to working expeditiously to pass this legislation and have President Trump sign it into law.