Gallagher Demands Immediate DNI & Commerce Department Answers on Chinese Spy Base in Cuba

WASHINGTON, DC – Rep. Mike Gallagher (R-WI), Chairman of the Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party seeks immediate response from Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines and Secretary of Commerce Gina Raimondo following detailed reports of an active Chinese spy base in Cuba. The Chairman outlined specific concerns regarding the Chinese Communist Party's use of PRC telecommunications firms like Huawei and ZTE to help spy on Americans from locations in Cuba.

In the letter, Chairman Gallagher wrote, "In light of the PRC’s approach to modernizing its defense and intelligence capabilities, it is clear any enhancement or expansion of PRC SIGINT capabilities in Cuba is likely to be aided by PRC telecommunications companies. Having offices and business operations in Cuba would provide cover for PRC SIGINT operators to travel to and from the island without creating the same suspicion as official travel. Huawei, for example, has assisted the Cuban government in modernizing its telecommunications and Internet infrastructure since the 2000s, and, like ZTE and Great Dragon Information Technology, has a permanent presence there." 

Click HERE to view this press release on the Select Committee's website.

Click HERE to view the letter or read the text below:

Dear Director Haines and Secretary Raimondo,

I am writing today to express my concern about the reported expansion of the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) signals intelligence (SIGINT) presence in Cuba. In addition to the threat such facilities pose to U.S. military operations in the southeastern United States, the enhancement of PRC capabilities also could create new collection opportunities against sensitive U.S. military testing facilities, like the Atlantic Undersea Testing and Evaluation Center (AUTEC), that are critical to maintaining U.S. military advantage.

Over the last decade, the PRC’s Military-Civil Fusion Development Strategy increased the cooperation between the military-industrial and commercial sectors in the PRC. By leveraging innovation in the private sector, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) gains access to capabilities more quickly than if it relied on the state-owned defense conglomerates alone. For SIGINT, this means a much closer relationship between the PLA’s Strategic Support Force and the Ministry of State Security and the PRC’s information and communications technology companies, including but not limited to Huawei and ZTE. The PRC’s Intelligence Law passed in 2017 also made clear that Beijing expects to be able to use PRC corporate assets to collect intelligence both at home and abroad.

In light of the PRC’s approach to modernizing its defense and intelligence capabilities, it is clear any enhancement or expansion of PRC SIGINT capabilities in Cuba is likely to be aided by PRC telecommunications companies. Having offices and business operations in Cuba would provide cover for PRC SIGINT operators to travel to and from the island without creating the same suspicion as official travel. Huawei, for example, has assisted the Cuban government in modernizing its telecommunications and Internet infrastructure since the 2000s, and, like ZTE and Great Dragon Information Technology, has a permanent presence there.

The PLA’s SIGINT collection and the PRC companies that support it have relied in part on accessing or exploiting U.S. intellectual property, even as they have undermined U.S. interests, violated U.S. export control restrictions, and boosted the surveillance and censorship capabilities of authoritarian states. Consequently, I have the following questions about the Intelligence Community’s awareness of the connections between PRC SIGINT and commercial activities and whether this information has been used to inform ongoing export licensing decisions:

(1) Which PRC information and communications technology companies provide support to the PRC SIGINT program outside the PRC, including technical support and operational cover?

(2) Have the identities and activities of these companies and their contribution to PRC SIGINT operations been shared with the Department of Commerce, or any other member of the End-User Review Committee?

(3) How many applications for export licenses to these PRC companies have been approved since the Intelligence Community reportedly became aware of the PRC SIGINT facilities in Cuba in 2019? How many of these applications did the Department of Commerce reject? How many of the approved applications are for products that could enable SIGINT collection, processing, or analysis?

(4) Do any of these companies have export licenses pending before the Department of Commerce?

(5) Did the Intelligence Community’s knowledge of these companies and their support to PRC SIGINT operations factor in decisions on whether to grant licenses? Will it factor in decisions currently facing the Department of Commerce?

The House Select Committee on the Strategic Competition Between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party has broad authority to “investigate and submit policy recommendations on the status of the Chinese Communist Party’s economic, technological, and security progress and its competition with the United States” under H. Res. 11.

Thank you for your consideration. I look forward to working with you to ensure that American technology and products are not used to support intelligence efforts against the United States.