Gallagher Presses FCC on U.S. Cell Phones and Devices Using Chinese, Russian GPS Satellites

WASHINGTON, D.C.-- Chairman Mike Gallagher (R-WI) of the House Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party wrote to FCC Chairwoman Jessica Rosenworcel following reports that U.S. cell phones and other devices are receiving and processing signals from Chinese and Russian satellites in violation of the FCC’s rules.

Most of the modern economy relies on satellite GPS systems – the energy grid, stock exchanges, aviation, and wireless 9-1-1 services. The FCC allows U.S. and European satellites to provide the connectivity for these crucial services and devices.

In the letter, Chairman Gallagher writes, “Current FCC rules permit mobile and other GNSS [Global Navigation Satellite Systems] receivers to receive and process signals from the U.S. Global Positioning System (GPS) and any foreign GNSS that has been approved through a process the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) adopted in 2011. To date, only the European Galileo GNSS has been approved.  However, we have become aware that U.S. mobile phones and other connected devices are receiving and processing signals from the PRC BeiDou and Russian GLONASS GNSS constellations, in violation of the FCC’s rules.”

Gallagher continues, “It appears one reason that carriers and device and component manufacturers are using these unauthorized signals is that the United States is woefully behind in its deployment and activation of its next generation of GPS satellites. However, Galileo provides access to a full constellation of the most advanced GNSS technologies and is operated by our close allies in the European Union. As such, there is little need for the FCC to waive its own rule to allow U.S. devices to use unauthorized foreign signals.”

Chairman Gallagher posed a series of questions to the FCC Chairwoman, seeking answers on enforcement measures the FCC levies on the use of unauthorized satellites, the authorization of new satellite systems from U.S. allies, and the FCC’s analysis of the national security risks posed by satellites from adversarial nations.

Click HERE to read a copy of the letter or continue reading below.

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Dear Chairwoman Rosenworcel,

We write to request information concerning the reception and processing of signals from Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) operated by unauthorized entities other than United States government and the European Union, including the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Russia, by mobile devices operating in the United States.

As you are aware, GNSS is a central component of the modern economy. Our critical infrastructure, such as the energy grid and stock exchanges, as well as aviation, other industries, and especially wireless 9-1-1 services, rely on GNSS signals to function. At the same time, nearly everyone with a mobile phone – a group that includes 97% of American adults – obtains positioning, navigation, and timing information using GNSS receivers embedded in those phones.

Current FCC rules permit mobile and other GNSS receivers to receive and process signals from the U.S. Global Positioning System (GPS) and any foreign GNSS that has been approved through a process the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) adopted in 2011. To date, only the European Galileo GNSS has been approved. However, we have become aware that U.S. mobile phones and other connected devices are receiving and processing signals from the PRC BeiDou and Russian GLONASS GNSS constellations, in violation of the FCC’s rules.

It appears one reason that carriers and device and component manufacturers are using these unauthorized signals is that the U.S. is woefully behind in its deployment and activation of its next generation of GPS satellites. However,  Galileo provides access to a full constellation of the most advanced GNSS technologies and is operated by our close allies in the European Union. As such, there is little need for the FCC to waive its own rule to allow U.S. devices to use unauthorized foreign signals.

Current events in Eastern Europe (including significant Russian jamming and spoofing of GNSS signals) call into question the wisdom of accepting this workaround and suggest it is critical that the FCC enforce its rules against using unauthorized signals from foreign satellites, particularly in light of evidence of Chinese cooperation with Russia in the prosecution of the war against Ukraine.This is particularly concerning as spoofing and other interference has affected civil aviation in areas far away from Russia and Ukraine. FCC action would be consistent with the agency’s focus on potential threats to U.S. national security arising from the use of technology developed by companies controlled by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and from the provision of telecommunications services by CCP-controlled carriers. As you explained in your September 5, 2023 letter to Chairman Gallagher, “the Commission has taken significant actions to protect our networks” and “is examining additional steps it should take” to that end.

In this context, we respectfully request information on the use of unauthorized GNSS signals in the U.S. Please respond to the following questions by March 30, 2024:

• Is the FCC aware of any mobile handsets or other devices operating in the U.S. that receive and process signals from GNSS constellations that have not been authorized to serve the U.S.?

• Is it contrary to FCC rules for handsets and other devices to receive and process signals from unauthorized GNSS constellations? Is it the responsibility of component vendors, device makers, or carriers to ensure that such signals are not received and processed by devices that use GNSS?

• Has the FCC taken any steps to enforce its rules concerning reception and processing of unauthorized GNSS signals? If so, describe the steps the FCC has taken to do so.

• As noted above, the only non-U.S. GNSS constellation authorized to operate in the U.S. is Galileo. Why have no other constellations been approved for operation in the U.S.?

• Has the FCC conducted an analysis of the national security risks associated with handsets and other devices receiving and processing signals from unauthorized GNSS constellations? If so, provide any such analysis to the Committee.

• As noted above, it appears that handsets and other devices use unauthorized GNSS signals because of a perception that access to authorized signals is not sufficient to ensure location accuracy in some circumstances, despite the availability of advanced L5 band signals from 18 U.S. GPS satellites and from the complete Galileo constellation. To what extent would finishing the deployment and activation of the next generation of U.S. GPS satellites broadcasting the L5 band address such concerns?

• Does the FCC require or desire further statutory authorities to address the effect of the use of unauthorized GNSS signals on national security?

The House Select Committee on the Strategic Competition Between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party has broad authority to “investigate and submit policy recommendations on the status of the Chinese Communist Party’s economic, technological, and security progress and its competition with the United States” under H. Res. 11.