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Gallagher, Rubio, Select Committee Members Urge Sec. Raimondo to Safeguard American Chip Design from Chinese Communist Party Threat

November 2, 2023

WASHINGTON, DC – As first reported by Reuters, Rep. Mike Gallagher (R-WI) and Rep. Raja Krishnamoorthi (D-IL), Chairman and Ranking Member of the House Select Committee on the Strategic Competition Between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party, alongside Senator Marco Rubio (R-FL) and a number of their colleagues on the Select Committee, today sent a letter to Commerce Secretary, Gina Raimondo, calling on the Department to leverage export control authorities to fight against the misuse of open-source technology by the Chinese Communist Party.

In the letter, the lawmakers write, “The industry of chip design is currently dominated by western firms, a chokepoint that the United States has leveraged with its export controls on advanced computing and semiconductors going to the PRC. While the benefits of open-source collaboration on RISC-V promise to be significant, it can only be realized when contributors are working with the sole aim of improving the technology, and not aiding the geopolitical interests of the PRC. In response, the United States should build a robust ecosystem for open-source collaboration among the U.S. and our allies while ensuring the PRC is unable to benefit from that work."

In addition to Chairman Gallagher, Ranking Member Krishnamoorthi, and Senator Rubio, the letter was penned by Reps. Kathy Castor (D-FL), Rob Wittman (R-VA), Mikie Sherrill (D-NJ), Blaine Luetkemeyer (R-MO), Haley Stevens (D-MI), Andy Barr (R-KY), Dan Newhouse (R-WA), John Moolenar (R-MI), Darin LaHood (R-IL), Neal Dunn (R-FL), Jim Banks (R-IN), Dusty Johnson (R-SD), Ashley Hinson (R-IA), and Carlos Gimenez (R-FL).

In order to preserve technological innovation but also protect U.S. national security interests, the lawmakers ask Secretary Raimondo a number of questions, including:

  • What is the Administration’s plan to prevent the PRC from achieving dominance in the RISC-V technology and leveraging that dominance at the expense of U.S. national and economic security?

  • What are the potential national security risks posed by the expanding use of RISC-V technology? How do existing U.S. government policies related to the use of open-source technologies in sensitive systems address these risks?

  • How would PRC dominance in RISC-V hardware affect the cybersecurity concerns related to Internet of Things and its application to critical infrastructure?

Click HERE to view a copy of the letter or read below.

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Dear Secretary Raimondo,

We are writing to express our concerns about the national security risks posed by the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) significant investment in RISC-V chip design architecture with the explicit purpose of undermining U.S. export controls and leapfrogging our technological leadership in chip design. Urgent action is needed to prevent U.S. technology and technical know-how from contributing to the PRC’s utilization of this technology.

RISC-V is a free and open-source instruction set used for the development of custom processors that allows anyone to design, manufacture and sell processors, without royalties or licensing fees. The industry of chip design is currently dominated by western firms, a chokepoint that the United States has leveraged with its export controls on advanced computing and semiconductors going to the PRC. While the benefits of open-source collaboration on RISC-V promise to be significant, it can only be realized when contributors are working with the sole aim of improving the technology, and not aiding the geopolitical interests of the PRC. In response, the United States should build a robust ecosystem for open-source collaboration among the U.S. and our allies while ensuring the PRC is unable to benefit from that work.

The PRC already understands the national security implications of RISC-V technology. A leading academic at the Chinese Academy of Engineering, Ni Guangnan (倪光南) recently remarked that RISC-V architecture “provides opportunities for China to take the initiative in the development of the chip industry” and linked the development of RISC-V technology to the PRC’s desire to achieve “technological self-reliance.” Ni further suggested PRC success in RISC-V will contribute to the PRC becoming “an open-source power” with contributions in both hardware and software.

The PRC is also moving to dominate the production of RISC-V chips. In 2022, the PRC reportedly represented a staggering 50% of all RISC-V chips shipped globally, which is a figure that is likely to increase without U.S. government intervention. Additionally, early this summer, the China Electronic Industry Standardization Technology Association (中国电子工业标准化技术协会) announced the formation of a “RISC-V Working Committee” to promote “China’s industrial development” and “internationalization of Chinese standards.” Leading participants of the new committee featured PRC firms on the Department of Commerce Entity List, including HiSilicon Technologies and the National University of Defense Technology. On the global stage, the “international organization” “RISC-V Alliance” is increasingly dominated by PRC firms, allowing the PRC mass access to U.S. firms expertise in RISC-V.

The U.S. government cannot sit idly by while U.S. innovation and technical expertise on RISC-V is funneled to the PRC through organizations like the RISC-V Alliance. The U.S. government should leverage authorities under the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 to require U.S. persons engaging with the PRC on RISC-V technology to first receive an export control license from the Department of Commerce. This will grant the U.S. government insight into U.S. interactions with the PRC on RISC-V technology and prevent U.S. companies from transferring technical expertise on RISC-V without U.S. government approval.

Considering these developments, we would like your answers to the following questions:

  • What is the Administration’s plan to prevent the PRC from achieving dominance in the RISC-V technology and leveraging that dominance at the expense of U.S. national and economic security?

  • What are the potential national security risks posed by the expanding use of RISC-V technology? How do existing U.S. government policies related to the use of open-source technologies in sensitive systems address these risks?

  • How is the Administration working with U.S. companies to address these potential security risks associated with these technologies?

  • How could the Administration apply the authorities provided by the Executive Order 14017 on Securing America’s Supply Chains to address the risks posed by RISC-V to cyber security and U.S. industry?

  • How would PRC dominance in RISC-V hardware affect the cybersecurity concerns related to Internet of Things and its application to critical infrastructure?