Lawmakers Grill Tech Giants Over Chinese and Russian Links in Undersea Cable Networks
WASHINGTON, D.C. – This week, Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party Chairman John Moolenaar (R-MI), House Homeland Security Subcommittee on Transportation and Maritime Security Chairman Carlos Gimenez (R-FL), and Rep. Keith Self (R-TX) sent a letter to Google, Meta, Microsoft, and Amazon, probing whether the subsea cable systems that each company maintains direct or indirect operational involvement with contain components produced, maintained, or repaired by entities affiliated with the People’s Republic of China (PRC), such as S.B. Submarine Systems, Huawei Marine, China Telecom, or China Unicom, or the Russian Federation. Subsea cable systems are responsible for 99 percent of the telecommunications activity across oceans. In recognition of these threats, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) announced this month that it will vote on a rule to prohibit the use of PRC-manufactured technology and equipment in any subsea cable system that ends in the United States.
The members’ investigation comes after recent reporting revealed entities affiliated with the PRC were potentially providing maintenance for or servicing Department of Defense digital infrastructure through Microsoft.
The members request information from each company detailing the subsea cable systems in which the company, its subsidiaries, or affiliates operate or are involved with, all entities that are authorized to perform construction, repair, or maintenance services for the cables since 2018, the physical and cyber safeguards put in place by each company to protect the cables during this maintenance or repair, whether each company has ever suspected tampering in this process, and more, by August 4, 2025. The members also request a briefing from each company on the information by August 8, 2025.
Read the full letter here and highlights below:
In the letter, the members write, “Resting on the ocean floor, submarine telecommunications cables, often referred to as ‘subsea cables,’ form one of the most strategically significant, and increasingly vulnerable, components of the world’s digital infrastructure. Subsea cables transmit over 95 percent of intercontinental data, powering not only global commerce and innovation but also the core operational systems of national security, intelligence, and defense. Their uninterrupted function is essential to your companies’ platforms and to the communications systems upon which the U.S. government and its allies rely daily. As co-owners, consortium members, service integrators, or critical end-users, your companies play a central role in the functionality, resilience, and security of these systems. As such, your participation is essential to ongoing congressional oversight efforts examining the extent to which foreign adversarial actors are positioning themselves, both overtly and covertly, to compromise subsea cable systems at key points of vulnerability.”
The members continue, “A growing body of evidence points to a coordinated pattern of coordinated malign activity linked to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the Russian Federation targeting subsea infrastructure in the Baltic Sea, Indo-Pacific, and other strategic regions. In the Baltic, multiple sabotage incidents in recent years have been attributed to commercial vessels whose flag registration, beneficial ownership, or operational control are traceable to PRC or Russian interests. These vessels have engaged in deliberate anchor-dragging, transponder disablement, and irregular navigational behavior in proximity to high-value subsea cables, which are tactics consistent with grey-zone operations designed to exploit legal ambiguity and avoid direct attribution.”
The members conclude, “Amid these risks, the Committees are examining whether leading U.S. technology firms have adopted adequate safeguards to mitigate exposure to adversarial entities involved in subsea cable operations. We are particularly concerned by the possibility that entities affiliated with the PRC, such as SBSS, Huawei Marine, China Telecom, and China Unicom, have continued to provide maintenance or servicing to cable systems in which your companies maintain direct or indirect operational involvement or ownership. Congressional oversight of these matters is essential to ensuring that foreign access to subsea cable infrastructure does not become a backdoor for espionage, disruption, or exploitation of U.S. data and communications assets. To support the Committees’ investigation, we request that each company submit a separate written response no later than 5:00 p.m. on August 4, 2025, addressing the inquiries and information requests outlined below. Each response should encompass all relevant entities under your corporate structure, including parent companies, subsidiaries, affiliates, joint ventures, consortia, and any special purpose vehicles operating on your behalf or under your direction.”
###