Moolenaar, Krishnamoorthi Call For Tightening Export Controls on Chips Critical to China's AI Platform DeepSeek and Other Measures to Address its Risks to Americans’ Data and Security
WASHINGTON DC — Chairman John Moolenaar (R-MI) and Ranking Member Raja Krishnamoorthi (D-IL) of the House Select Committee on the Strategic Competition Between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party urged National Security Advisor, Mike Waltz, to review the potential national security benefits of placing export controls on semiconductor chips critical to the AI infrastructure of People's Republic of China (PRC) company, DeepSeek. As part of the review, the lawmakers also asked to strengthen controls on shipments through third countries that pose a high risk of diversion to the PRC.
This comes following President Trump's memorandum to key agencies calling for, “the Secretary of State and Commerce to review the U.S. export control system in light of developments involving strategic adversaries.”
The lawmakers further requested that NSA Waltz consider updating Federal Acquisition Regulations to prohibit the federal government from acquiring AI systems based on PRC models such as DeepSeek, except for appropriate intelligence and research purposes. They also asked Mr. Waltz consider using E.O. 13873 to restrict PRC AI systems from being used in U.S. critical infrastructure. The letter notes that DeepSeek's privacy policy explicitly envisions data flows to the PRC.
In the letter, the lawmakers write, “DeepSeek made extensive use of Nvidia’s H800 chip, the first chip that Nvidia designed specifically to fall outside U.S. export controls. This demonstrates what the Select Committee has long argued: frequently updating export controls is imperative to ensure the PRC will not exploit regulatory gaps and loopholes to advance their AI ambitions. Any review conducted by the NSC on the effectiveness of export controls should address delayed updates to our export controls. On the Select Committee, we stand in support of American AI innovation – and that includes imposing reasonable safeguards to protect such innovation from the PRC."
The lawmakers continued, "It is clear we are at an inflection point in the AI market where PRC AI systems are increasingly available for use in the United States. It is imperative that we do not allow PRC AI systems to gain significant market share in the United States, while acquiring the data of U.S. users that only further enable the capabilities of the AI system.”
Chairman Moolenaar on the importance of the letter: "To protect American leadership in AI, the U.S. must swiftly strengthen export controls on the technology behind DeepSeek’s model, and also use the Information and Communications Technology and Services (ICTS) to block Deepseek’s operations in the United States. Like any claims from China, Americans should be skeptical of DeepSeek’s self-reported development costs. In this case, the rapid growth and CCP control behind the company raises serious national security concerns and demands immediate action."
Ranking Member Krishnamoorthi: “DeepSeek is deeply alarming, and it is seeking to undermine American AI leadership. Export controls and AI innovation are not mutually exclusive, but two sides of the same coin. If we want to outcompete the CCP in AI, we must protect our lead, safeguard Americans’ data, and use common sense.”
View the lawmakers’ letter HERE or continue reading below.
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Dear Mr. Waltz,
As you know, on January 20, 2025, President Trump issued a memorandum to key agencies calling for, among other priorities, “the Secretary of State and Commerce to review the U.S. export control system in light of developments involving strategic adversaries.” Shortly thereafter, People’s Republic of China (PRC) AI firm, DeepSeek, released a sophisticated model that made extensive use of Nvidia’s H20 chip, which is currently outside the scope of U.S. export controls. We ask that as part of this review, you consider the potential national security benefits of placing an export control on Nvidia’s H20 and chips of similar sophistication while cracking down on chips designed specifically for AI inference, not just training.
Some are already using DeepSeek’s latest model to cast doubt on the effectiveness of U.S. export controls, an argument we respectfully reject. DeepSeek’s own founder, Liang Wenfeng, acknowledged that the U.S. “embargo on high-end chips” was a major roadblock to the company’s development. Furthermore, DeepSeek made extensive use of Nvidia’s H800 chip, the first chip that Nvidia designed specifically to fall outside U.S. export controls. This demonstrates what the Select Committee has long argued: frequently updating export controls is imperative to ensure the PRC will not exploit regulatory gaps and loopholes to advance their AI ambitions. Any review conducted by the NSC on the effectiveness of export controls should address delayed updates to our export controls. On the Select Committee, we stand in support of American AI innovation – and that includes imposing reasonable safeguards to protect such innovation from the PRC.
Second, it is clear we are at an inflection point in the AI market where PRC AI systems are increasingly available for use in the United States. It is imperative that we do not allow PRC AI systems to gain significant market share in the United States, while acquiring the data of U.S. users that only further enable the capabilities of the AI system. The DeepSeek privacy policy explicitly provides that the company “store[s] the information we collect in . . . servers located in the People's Republic of China.” We ask you to consider updating Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR) to prohibit the federal government from acquiring AI systems based on PRC models such as DeepSeek, except for appropriate intelligence and research purposes. We further request you consider using E.O. 13873 to restrict PRC AI systems from being used in U.S. critical infrastructure, while ensuring the agencies charged with enforcing these safeguards are appropriately resourced to do so.
Third, as part of the review, we ask that you look for ways to strengthen controls on shipments through third countries that pose a high risk of diversion. For example, Singapore represented 22% of Nvidia’s revenue in its most recently quarterly statement, despite the company itself revealing most of these shipments ultimately went to users outside of Singapore. Countries like Singapore should be subject to strict licensing requirements absent a willingness to crack down on PRC transshipment through their territory.
Thank you for your continued work on this important matter.