Moolenaar, Krishnamoorthi Write to Pentagon & State Department about Chinese Military Research in the Arctic

WASHINGTON, D.C.-- Chairman John Moolenaar (R-MI) and Ranking Member Raja Krishnamoorthi (D-IL) of the House Select Committee on the Strategic Competition Between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party expressed concern about the CCP’s growing presence in the Arctic, particularly the national security risks posed by Chinese dual use military research in the region. In a letter to Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin, the lawmakers lay out problematic CCP-backed dual use research activities in Iceland and Norway, emphasizing the security risk this may pose to our NATO allies and the United States. The letter also emphasizes the importance of working with our allies and partners to counter this threat.

Moolenaar and Krishnamoorthi write, “Both the [People’s Republic of China] and Russia are expanding their military operations in the Arctic. The region is an operational zone for the deployment of nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines. For the United States and NATO, maintaining a strategic advantage in the Arctic strengthens the effectiveness of our nuclear deterrence. The Arctic is located at the crossroads of the shortest air and missile routes between the United States and any location in Eurasia, and thus is crucial for early warning systems, missile defense, and potentially intercepting missile attacks.”

The letter acknowledges the important work already underway to counter this threat, and and poses the following questions to Secretaries Austin and Blinken:

1. What is your department’s assessment on the national security risk posed by the PRC dual-use research in Svalbard, Iceland, and the mainland Nordic locations of EISCAT on U.S. military operations, particularly in terms of missile defense, submarine detection, and satellite tracking capabilities?
2. Earlier in 2024, the Norwegian government called off a plan to sell the last privately owned land in Svalbard to the PRC. What engagements have your departments had, if any, regarding private, Western buyers attempting to purchase the last private land in Svalbard? 
3. Has your department discussed concerns about PRC dual-use research in the Arctic with the Norwegian, Icelandic, or Swedish governments?
4. What specific steps can the United States and its NATO allies take to appropriately address PRC access to sensitive dual-use technologies and data collected in the Arctic region?

Read more about this development in Newsweek HERE.

View the lawmakers’ letter HERE